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SUMMARY*  
Providing universal access to drinking water remains a formidable challenge in the cities of 
developing countries and all potential technical and institutional solutions need to be taken 
into account. By looking at the specific example of “user group networks” set up in a poor 
neighbourhood in the North-East of Mumbai, this article aims to highlight the ability of local 
communities to design and run functional systems that compensate for shortcomings in the 
public service.  We will analyse the effective role that users play in regulating these groups at 
local level as well as the political-territorial implications of this type of management. After 
providing a clear overview of the systems that have emerged and their modus operandi, we 
will describe and assess them from a critical technical/economic perspective in order to 
suggest possible improvements. 
More generally, our research is part of a broader attempt to study the different ways of 
providing access to urban water and the legitimacy of local communities in taking the 
process in hand. We wish to contribute to the debate that focuses on providing a 
differentiated service to the inhabitants of the same city. 
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Introduction 
Providing universal access to drinking water remains a formidable challenge in the 
cities of developing countries where an estimated 500 million people still do not have a 
proper service (USAID/PADCO 2001). Inhabitants are forced to group together to overcome a 
deficient or totally absent public service, sometimes simply to ensure their survival. In India, 
where there is still a strong statist culture in the management of potable water systems, the 
government actually denies that alternative networks exist, preferring to consider such 
systems as stop-gap solutions where the universal public service system cannot keep up with 
rapid expansion. However, in 2001, 26 per cent of the urban population was still not 
connected to the public drinking water network (World Bank 2006) and in certain 
neighbourhoods, alternative arrangements were beginning to acquire a de facto air of 
permanence. Given that the conventional network paradigm is coming under strain from a 
diverse range of alternative solutions, it would therefore appear well worthwhile to focus on 
these arrangements within the perspective of universal service.  
This article will use a detailed analysis of such practices in a poor neighbourhood of 
Mumbai to contribute to the debate over alternatives to conventional public service 
networks. Research into this type of solution was first initiated by the World Bank in Nigeria 
(Lee and Anas 1989) before being extended to other Southern countries. It has highlighted 
user reliance on private offerings to replace, or round out the public system offering (Sethi 
1992; Humplick et al. 1992; Vaidya 1994; Choe et al. 1996). Once the deployment of these 
types of “compensation strategies” was highlighted (Zérah 2000), a number of studies 
focused more specifically on the role of small private operators in catering to the needs of 
populations that have not been connected to the public service (Collignon and Vézina 2000; 
Llorente and Zérah 2006). They show how the different solutions available to such 
households (privately-drilled wells, resale of water, mini-networks, etc.) have been 
effectively tailored to the local context in which they have developed and how at least some 
look as if they will survive into the future. And even if they are not as effective, these 
systems are frequently cheaper and much more flexible than a public service based on the 
principle of full cost recovery. These research findings partly explain the failure of the 
privatisation reforms of the 1990s based around the supposed “willingness to pay” of low-
income users and in particular, they challenge the temporary nature of some of these stop-
gap systems.  
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In Indian cities, these types of practices have been observed among populations 
connected to networks (Zérah 2000; Dutta 2005), in newly-urbanised middle- and upper-
middle class areas (Maria 2008), in informal neighbourhoods (Raghupati 2003; Conan 2004) 
and in slum areas where there is no legal title to land (Tovey 2002). To complete the picture, 
we felt it necessary to analyse the specific case of a recently-authorised slum area1 where 
alternative arrangements are in the process of becoming permanent.  
This article will focus on mini networks, described as user group networks. These are 
unusual insofar as they have been set up and run by the inhabitants in spite of the fact that 
their neighbourhood now has official legal status. At a first glance, they are quite similar to 
the gali taps highlighted by Tovey (2002) or the spaghetti pipe type informal networks 
identified by Raghutpati (2003) in Delhi, however they are different in terms of their specific 
local geographic and land ownership features. What are the specific characteristics of these 
user group networks? Can they now be considered as sustainable solutions and if so, what 
stance have the authorities taken in this regard? Building on other research into the links 
between network-based services and urban spaces (Graham, Marvin 2001; Jaglin 2005), this 
analysis will attempt to show how these “user group networks” reflect specific 
territorialisation strategies. And on a broader level, we will analyse the whole issue of 
perpetuating the local water supply systems set up by poor communities. 
This study2 presents the findings of field research conducted in 2007 in a poor 
neighbourhood of Mumbai that is badly served by the municipal network. Since the area is 
located at an altitude, water pressure in the “conventional” system managed by the City 
Council is insufficient to serve all dwellings, so residents have designed about fifteen 
technical solutions comprising a motorised pump and a network of narrow water pipes. The 
creation and autonomous management of these user group networks is an opportunity for 
those communities involved in developing specific sets of operating rules and standards 
outside the conventional public system. 
                                                          
1 In India, there are two types of slum: squatter settlements comprise self-built, generally unauthorised 
settlements while slum areas consist of older, insalubrious slum dwellings that now have authorised legal 
status (see Dupont and Ramanathan 2007). 
2 A four-months research was necessary in 2007 in order to circumscribe the specific features of the research 
subject. 93 users and all of the slum area community leaders were interviewed. 
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1  An authorised slum not connected to the public drinking water network 
1.1 A marginalised neighbourhood from a spatial and economic perspective 
The research was conducted in a poor, peripheral neighbourhood of Mumbai in the 
western extremity of Ward3 S4 in Constituency 216, or more specifically between the wall of 
Sanjay Gandhi National Park5 and the gravity-fed water mains system that feeds Mumbai’s 
reservoirs6 (see Maps No.1 and No.2). The administrative situation of this slum was 
regularised in 1997 and it is now called Ram Nagar. It has a population of around 20,000. 
The neighbourhood is bound by the primary water mains to the east and by the Park 
to the west (see Map 3 and the illustration). It comprises successive dwellings built along a 
gradient between 50m and 110m. This system of settlements based around different levels 
reflects the area’s social geography. Living conditions deteriorate the higher up one lives and 
they reach their nadir at the top where the worst-off live7. Most of the inhabitants work but 
the salaries of those interviewed are very low and vary between 1,500 rupees (27€) and 
about 10,000 rupees (185€) per month. The median monthly salary is about 3,000 rupees 
(55€). The majority are able to read and write and many speak two languages (Marathi and 
Hindi), however virtually nobody can speak English. 
Given its location (at the periphery of S-ward) and its socio-economic profile (very 
poor population), the BMC8 has little real presence in the neighbourhood which continues to 
be regarded as a slum in spite of the fact that it now has authorised status. Its role is limited 
to officially carrying out the work that the local population has requested through its local 
                                                          
3 The local government system was overhauled in 1964 with the creation of “wards” (districts) as a first step 
towards decentralisation and in order to speed up administrative procedures and make them more effective. 
Mumbai was divided into 24 wards, each of which was split into Zones corresponding to electoral 
constituencies.  
4 S-Ward is relatively poor compared to Mumbai’s other wards. There is no real industry and only limited 
economic activity. The 2001 census identified a total population of 691,227, of which 85.83% live in slums (the 
average for Mumbai as a whole is 54.08% with a total population of 6.475 million). 
5 Sanjay Gandhi National Park, which straddles the research area, is the world’s largest urban park with an area 
of 104km² and the most visited park in Asia. It was created in 1961 and is now surrounded by a wall designed 
to protect it from urbanisation. 
6 Since 1954, a section of Mumbai’s primary water supply network traverses the West of the Ward. This gravity-
fed system comprises four principal mains that carry on into the South of Mumbai. They feed a whole network 
of storage reservoirs which in turn feed a secondary distribution network. Normally, nobody is allowed to live 
along this pipeline for maintenance reasons, however, in reality, there are dwellings along almost its entire 
length and this is also the case in S Ward. 
7 The Adivasi (indigenous population), Dalits and migrant workers are forced to live on the top of the 
mountain. They comprise an estimated 600 people living in extremely difficult economic circumstances. 
8 “BMC” is the acronym of Mumbai city council, i.e., Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation. 
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representatives. The Corporator of Constituency 216 and the Legislative Assembly Member 
(MLA) for S-Ward are the two key actors in Ram Nagar’s development. They belong to the 
two main political parties operating in Ram Nagar, i.e., the Corporator is a member of Shiv 
Sena9 while the MLA member belongs to the National Congress Party10 (NCP). 
1.2 Origins of this user group networks: A response to the failure of the public drinking 
water system 
Until 1997, the BMC refused to supply Ram Nagar with water due to its unauthorised 
status11 and the inhabitants had to get their drinking water illegally from the City’s main 
water supply. In order to limit the damage to the water supply system, the municipality 
installed a small number of taps directly onto the water mains in the early 1980s before 
adding a lot more in the early 1990s12. Once their settlement had been authorised, in order 
to be officially connected to the water supply network, users banded together in “user 
groups” of about ten users based on their physical proximity and in line with established 
practice in Mumbai13.  
Water pressure from the public reservoir serving S-Ward is sufficient to pump water to 
locations not exceeding an altitude of 50 meters. The dwellings in Ram Nagar which are 
technically excluded from any extension to the conventional supply network are directly 
hooked up to the primary water mains that feed the reservoir for S-ward (see Map No. 4 and 
diagram No.1). Dwellings located downhill to the east of the mains pipe get a good service 
but those lying uphill to the west have very poor water pressure. Since the City’s drinking 
water system is intermittent and gravity-fed, the water pressure inside the primary water 
mains varies considerably depending on the flow rate at any given time. Water cannot 
generally reach taps at an altitude of over 55 meters. Faced with the technical shortcomings 
                                                          
9 Shiv Sena is the Maharastra regional Hindu nationalist party with roughly the same ideology as the better-
known Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), “the party of the Indian people”. It opposes the NCP which broke away 
from the Indian National Congress (Congress Party). 
10 Created on 25 May 1999 following a rift with the Indian National Congress (INC) party. The INC was founded 
in 1885 and is the oldest political party in India. It spearheaded the nationalist drive for independence. This rift 
concerned the Italian origins of INC’s Chairperson, Sonia Gandhi. 
11 In 1997, the City voted to regularise the status of all slums that had existed before 1995. 
12 Indeed, as J. Ruet noted, we may wonder about the “schizophrenic” attitude of the authorities who began 
providing a service while simultaneously denying the existence of these users (Ruet 2002). 
13 A user group generally comprises between five to fifteen households that share the same connection 
(comprising a water meter and tap). The quarterly bill is then split on an equal basis between the different 
members of this group connection. This system of charging for water sets Mumbai apart from other Indian 
cities where water policy is based around installing standpipes in slums, generally free of charge. 
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of the public drinking water system, marginalised user groups have developed a modus 
operandi tailored to their neighbourhood’s physical constraints.  
This alternative consists of local networks supplied by a group connection to the 
BMC’s primary water mains and hooked up to a powerful electric pump (see diagram No.2). 
Because of its technical configuration, the water service only works when the pump 
is on and is limited – and rendered intermittent - by the electricity required to keep the 
pump running. The system’s operation and maintenance requires the presence of an 
employee tasked with getting the pump started and monitoring both the reservoir and the 
valve openings. This person is paid between 1,000 and 3,500 rupees a month (between 18€ 
and 54€) depending on the size of the network.  
This type of system can serve several groups of dwellings of very different sizes – 
from 40 to over 800 households – and is therefore much larger than a normal user group 
which is officially limited to 15 households under the aforementioned definition. There are a 
total of 15 such networks (see Map No.5) supplying drinking water throughout the slum to 
4,500 households or about 20,000 people in all (see diagram 1). In addition to the differing 
sizes of the fifteen networks, we also note the existence of several superimposed networks, 
indicating overlapping services within the same territory.  
These user group networks14 represent a major step forward for the inhabitants of a 
neglected area who have developed an alternative technical solution that has greatly 
improved their access to water. 
We will use two perspectives to analyse these systems: the approach used to create 
and manage them (2) and their modus operandi and performance (3). 
                                                          
14 By drawing upon existing “user group” jargon, we seek to associate this research with previous analyses 
and the terms “groups”, “arrangements”, “solutions” and “systems” will all refer back to the general term of 
“user group networks”. 
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2  Locally based systems involving a wide range of actors 
2.1 Involvement of a number of actors 
The timeline tracing the emergence of these user group networks points to the major 
role played by the Indian NGO, “Casp Plan”15 which managed to break the administrative log 
jam by getting community, municipal and political decision-makers around the same table. It 
played a key role in getting the slum’s first three networks up and running. 
The first phase involved mobilising the communities. Setting up and registering a 
large number of user groups (there were initially between 250 and 300 of these) appears to 
be a sine qua non for reaching a compromise with the municipality as it provides a legal 
framework for the whole process, legitimises demands and harnesses considerable financial 
potential. The second stage involved devising a low-cost technical solution. The compromise 
agreed upon was as follows. The municipality limited its commitment to installing a reduced 
infrastructure (based around a group connection and overground narrow diameter pipes 
powered by a motorised pump); however, the entire cost of this infrastructure plus 
installation, management and maintenance costs had to be picked up by the user group. The 
final stage consisted of drawing up a business plan. 75 per cent of the cost of the first three 
projects was paid for by the NGO. The total cost was somewhere between 1 and 1.5 million 
rupees (or 18,500 €), so this assistance amounted to 700,000 rupees.  The remaining 25 per 
cent was paid for by the inhabitants themselves. The initial contribution per head amounted 
to between 500 rupees and 1,500 rupees (between 9€ and 30€). The municipality did not 
participate in financing the project. 
After the NGO was wound down, the inhabitants turned to political financial backers 
for the additional funds needed to develop the infrastructure. The local situation is 
conducive to this type of arrangement as, although slum populations do not have much in 
the form of economic capital, they do have a certain amount of political capital that they 
know how to leverage in line with electoral opportunities. Conversely, elected 
                                                          
15 Community Aid and Sponsorship Program (CASP) was an Indian non-governmental organisation that was 
created in 1976 and wound down in late 2000. Most of its programmes focused on child education and living 
conditions and it had a presence all over India: http://www.caspindia.org/  
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representatives have considerable local financial clout16 and they need local votes to stay in 
office. Consequently, some user groups clearly appear to have political leanings and these 
are especially marked in systems sponsored by Shiv Sena. The party recruits “social workers” 
who provide an important link between the slum populations and their elected 
representatives and help to spread the party’s message. The funding of the largest network 
(840 members) by the Sri Chhatrapati Rahivasi Sangh community involved mobilising 
political support from local all the way up to national level with the backing of the BJP17 and 
helped raise 700,000 rupees. Once its efforts had borne fruit, Shiv Sena secured a physical 
presence in the neighbourhood’s central space by building a Shaka18 which has become the 
administrative centre for those dwellings covered by the network. Other structures skilfully 
raised funding for purely utilitarian ends without any regard to the political creed of the 
donor nor to any particular sense of political allegiance. For example, the Chnatrapathi 
Shivaji Mavrata Utsaw Mandal user group offered its political support to the MLA (affiliated 
to the NCP) after being turned away by the Corporator19. So, political representatives play a 
far from neutral role in the acquisition of network infrastructures. However, because of the 
inevitable political payback in terms of votes and party allegiance, many groups prefer the 
neutrality of independent financial backing even if this increases the contribution of each 
member (spread over time). 
The emergence of projects is closely related to those who back them and the 
underlying community entrepreneurial or market logic: 
- Some arrangements may be driven by a purely market approach and result more 
from an individual initiative than any collective aspirations. An enterprising inhabitant may 
decide to set up a network, raise the initial investment via a private loan and bring other 
inhabitants in, primarily for the purpose of reaching an optimal number of users. In this type 
of project, the private entrepreneur considers the other inhabitants simply as “consumers” 
and they see themselves more as “customers” than actually as members. These 
                                                          
16 In the form of special funds allocated based on the development needs of their constituency (in 2007, these 
amounted to 4,700 euros for the Corporator of the constituency studied and 150,000 € for the MLA for S-
Ward). 
17 The BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party), or “Party of the Indian People” is a Hindu nationalist party founded in 
1980. 
18 The ‘‘Shaka” is a building draped in Shiv Sena’s colours where the “social workers” meet. 
19 The Corporator claimed that “Chnatrapati Shivaji Mavrata Ustaw Mandal” (which was finally set up in 
2005) was not a priority project as all of its network members were already being served by neighbouring 
networks. 
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entrepreneurs are also motivated by a desire for recognition and power (indeed, each has 
had his neighbourhood named after him). For example, the project set up by Appa Balgue 
(founder of Shriram Sanjeevan Pani Prakalp water project in 2003) can be traced back to a 
conflict between the founder and other project leaders as well as the wish to free users from 
dependence on the existing service providers. By coming up with an innovative offering 
(individual taps), he was able to bring in 200 members. Consequently, this new competition-
based service allowed some users who were already connected to an existing network to 
either accumulate two service provider offerings from two competing networks or to get rid 
of their initial supplier20. 
- Other projects may be backed by an enterprising individual who volunteers to set 
up and run a network for the inhabitants of the neighbourhood. Their primary motivation is 
to boost their social status within the group. In this type of project, responsibility is shared 
by all of the group's members and all contribute equally to the initial project financing. Users 
see themselves as stakeholders. They are “members” and implicitly consider themselves to 
be the owners as well, so they fully intend to have a say in how the network is run.  
- Lastly, there is a category of projects that lies somewhere in between those driven 
by purely market logic and those based around a more cooperative mindset. Some networks 
appear to strengthen or create previously non-existent community links whereas other 
systems which were apparently community-based, quickly develop into purely market-driven 
systems. 
2.2 Different forms of network management 
The different approaches and mindsets that underpin the projects at the outset 
result in markedly different ways of running the networks and various degrees of user 
involvement in the network management committee (comprising a chairman, secretary and 
treasurer) depending on the user group size. We may distinguish four types of management: 
“consent- and community-based”; “delegated and democratic”; “private” and “confiscated”. 
- Some groups tend to be dominated by a charismatic founder who is deemed the 
most suitable person to run the network (albeit within a formal committee) because of 
his/her competencies and who has frequently gained the trust and confidence of the 
                                                          
20  This system is a lovely example of a flaw in the so-called theory of natural monopoly supposed to exist in 
the management of network-based services. 
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inhabitants. The founder is reappointed or the term of office is extended by means of 
“negative” participation insofar as the implicit approval of the members is expressed 
through the absence of any demands. This type of group functions by means of 
“neighbourhood participation” where users are able to convey any complaints to the leader 
through direct everyday contact. It is found especially in small groups where there are strong 
ties based around familiarity and trust and where the limited number of members facilitates 
consensus-building that would be difficult to achieve in structures of a larger size, e.g., 
concerning water distribution times. It, therefore, appears legitimate to characterise such 
groups as “community-based”.  
- Larger groups are administered by a complex management committee comprising 
elected micro-local leaders who each represent a group of dwellings. Although such groups 
may not actually be as “democratic” as they claim21, we should still recognise that this type 
of committee is generally fairly representative of the population that it serves. Each 
committee member uses formal monthly meetings to voice the demands of their immediate 
entourage at community network level and informs local users of the decisions that have 
been taken by the committee. The functions of this committee go way beyond running the 
water service. They also look after workaday community matters, ranging from disputes 
between neighbours to street lighting, the evacuation of rainwater and managing budgets. It 
holds an extraordinary general meeting once or twice a year where it reports back to the 
population on its activities for the period.  
- The committees of user groups run by a private entrepreneur largely resemble the 
management committees of private companies, comprising non-elected individuals that 
have played a key role in financing the network. The managers derive their legitimacy both 
from their financial stake in the network and their familiarity with the system. In such 
“private” networks, user involvement in running the network is virtually non-existent 
because there are no face-to-face meetings that would enable users to interact with the 
operator. And while private management is not necessarily resented provided users get a 
good service, if they feel they are getting a poor service there are few ways of changing 
things, barring direct confrontation between the “customer” and the private entrepreneur. 
However, as competing water services move into Ram Nagar (sometimes competing for the 
                                                          
21 On account of the informal nature of the election process, these leaders often seem to have been 
handpicked instead of actually elected.  
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same user areas), these interactions will probably lead to improvements as "customers" will 
have a wider choice of service provider.  
- Other networks are characterised by their refusal to involve users due to 
internecine struggles for the right to manage the network. Utkar Rhahivasi Vikas Mandal, 
founded in 1994 by Damodar Gaekward, is a perfect example. In 2004, the management 
committee fell victim to Shiv Sena nationalists who embezzled large sums of money. Once he 
had taken successful legal action in 2006, Damodar Gaekward confiscated the reins of 
management. He intends to use the fact that he has sole legitimate power to manage the 
service honestly, drawing upon his supposed skill and experience and political 
independence, although the latter claim is questionable as he has the backing of the MLA–
NCP. Users no longer have any real means of making themselves heard, yet this user group 
registers one of the highest rates of customer dissatisfaction concerning water distribution 
times. 
2.3 Withdrawal of the municipal authorities 
Faced with the technical difficulties of expanding the conventional service using 
existing infrastructure, the municipality implicitly encourages these initiatives. It views them 
as a cheap means of serving all of the populations of these poor enclaves without having to 
become involved in actually running them. 
So, while administrative requirements in India are normally complex and 
bureaucratic, requests for group connections are paradoxically straightforward and this has 
made it easier to get projects off the ground. Although these requirements have not been 
officially listed, they usually include the following:  
- putting together a “user group”; 
- providing proof of resident authorisation status22; 
- a declaration of responsibility issued by the founder; 
- prohibition of pumping water directly from the primary water mains with the obligation of 
placing a reservoir near the primary system; 
- property deeds for the land on which the pump and reservoir are to be located; and 
- cost estimates as well as the installation of the network obligatorily performed by an 
engineer accredited by the municipality and paid for by the community. 
                                                          
22 By producing a ration card, voter card or other ID. 
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However, compliance with these procedures is fairly random. Certain entrepreneurs 
are operating freely even though they are completely non-compliant and this pervading 
laxity actually acts as an incentive in the creation of informal systems. 
In spite of the large number of households connected, this type of system is still 
considered as simply a “user group” from a legal perspective. The municipality is only 
responsible for getting the water as far as the group connection. After that, sharing out and 
using the water is the responsibility of the inhabitants of Ram Nagar who are free to finance 
a “user group network” without any municipal participation. In other words, the 
municipality does not give any guarantee concerning reasonable access based on clearly 
defined quantitative (minimum duration of service), qualitative (health and sanitation) or 
economic (maximum individual charges) standards.  
 Since the de facto concession operator, i.e., the community or entrepreneur, is 
ultimately responsible for paying for the service, getting connected to the municipal 
system23, setting up and expanding the network and the day-to-day technical and financial 
management for an indefinite period, this institutional arrangement is proof of the 
withdrawal of the municipal authorities even though there is absolutely nothing in writing to 
this effect.  
2.4 Who puts up the money? (see Table 1) 
Analysis of the total cost of the different projects points to a number of findings. 
First, the inhabitants themselves contributed most (see diagram No.2). The total funding 
required for the fifteen networks amounted to 15.3 million rupees (283,300€). Users put up 
60 per cent, private entrepreneurs 10 per cent and NGOs 11 per cent. Political 
representatives stumped up a non-negligible 19 per cent of total financing. Conversely, BMC 
did not put up a penny and even had to be paid for installing infrastructure.  
The financing profile varies considerably from one project to another. Some are 
relatively heavily-funded by political actors while others may be paid for almost entirely by 
the users themselves. Self-financing is especially common for small projects24 where the 
                                                          
23 Billed by the municipality between 85,000 and 100,000 rupees (1,500 to 1,850 €), depending on the exact 
situation. 
24 But there are exceptions. The cost of the Sri Prasad Rahivasi Vikas Mandal project which was almost entirely 
user-funded, has exceeded 1,000,000 rupees since January 2010 due to the gradual installation of individual 
taps. This is also generally the case for projects funded by private entrepreneurs.  
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total cost is less than 500,000 rupees. Costly projects concern large-capacity systems and 
require at least one or several forms of external financing. So user contributions vary widely 
between projects (from 500 to 7,000 rupees per head) depending on what and how much 
backing has been secured. Projects with external backers require less user participation 
while self-financed projects involve higher per-head inhabitant contributions (sometimes 
spread over several years).  
There are major disparities in both total project costs and contributions raised due to 
a number of factors. Size, and especially the length of water pipes and the capacity of the 
motorised pump and reservoir, is a crucial determinant in actual infrastructure cost. The 
presence of an external financial backer also pushes up total cost which would appear to 
suggest the payment of bribes or kickbacks between various intermediaries. Finally, a 
comparison of total costs declared with “total contributions raised”25 sometimes highlights a 
significant surplus. Depending on the system in question, this surplus may be used to set up 
a reserve fund, improve the infrastructure, repay a loan put up by private entrepreneurs or 
to help fund the activities of a similar kind of association. 
2.5 A network-based process of territorialisation 
The methods used to set up and fund the networks highlight the approachs and 
power relations specific to Ram Nagar. Their physical extremities mark out spatial 
boundaries between neighbourhoods in which different approaches prevail and each user 
group network supplies its own territory. In one sense, “the network management and 
regulation processes are factors in territorialisation” (Jaglin 2005: 16). Here we take the 
“territorialisation process” to mean “the attempt by an individual or group to affect, 
influence or control people, phenomena or relationships by delimiting and asserting control 
over a geographical area” (Sack 1986: 19). Each user group has developed a method of 
“controlling” a “geographical area” within the slum. This results in micro-local, geo-political 
power struggles or “rivalries between different social and political forces that strive *…+ to 
increase their influence over the populations living in territories of various sizes, that is, 
regions, urban agglomerations, cities or neighbourhoods” (Lacoste 2002: 146).  
                                                          
25 “Total contributions raised” comprise all of the sums raised regardless of where they come from. This 
corresponds to the total actual cost. 
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The geographical dimension of the service helps shape “political-ideological 
territories” that are more or less marked depending on the group and which may be mapped 
(see Map No.6). 
A “micro” geo-political analysis of the networks points to these competing 
approaches and power relations. The Chnatrapati Shivaji Mavrata Ustaw Mandal network 
(No.15 on the Map) founded by Narkar in 2005 highlights an attempt at re-territorialisation 
by the MLA (NCP) via the water service. Users were already receiving a service (from 
networks No.9, No.4, No.12, or No.11 – see Map); however, the area was controlled by Shiv 
Sena (the Corporator had funded the bulk of the infrastructures), so the MLA (affiliated to 
the NCP) deemed it expedient to put up 80 per cent of the cost of financing this unneeded 
back-up network.  
The example of the Utkarsk Rahivasi Vikas Mandal network (No.4), where its founder 
Damodar Gaekward was forced to use discretionary powers, is comparable in some ways to 
declaring a “state of emergency” to deal with the equivalent of an attempted 
neighbourhood “coup d’état” by Shiv Sena. Since he had fallen out with the Corporator 
(affiliated to Shiv Sena), Damodar Gaekward began dealing only with the MLA (NCP). 
Nevertheless, these political allegiances need to be put in perspective. Although there is a 
very strong correlation between the financing method used and politicisation of the 
neighbourhood in question, this relationship is by no means systematic. Tanaji Vadi Seva 
Mandal (No.2), Krishna Seva Mandal (No.8) or even Shramik Vikassi Vibhag Mandal (No.1) 
are relatively free from political influence and any politicisation is based around 
circumstances and opportunities. It is virtually absent from user groups founded by private 
entrepreneurs (Nos. 3 and 14) where the basis of the service remains a commercial one. Just 
as in more communitarian and non-politicised groups, any political allegiances remain in the 
private sphere. The map clearly shows that a majority of Ram Nagar users claim allegiance to 
Shiv Sena. In territories that lean more to the Congress Party, these claims are generally less 
categorical.  
Finally, we may observe territorialisation creeping into commercial networks such as 
the Shriram Sanjeevam Pani Prakalp Project (No.14) founded by Appa Balgue. This private 
entrepreneur has used different approaches but a similar territorialisation strategy to extend 
his network to include new customers that were previously served by other networks. 
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Running a water distribution service based on a strategy of boosting market share is an 
excellent example of a flaw in the supposed theory of the natural monopoly of a network in 
a given space. In Ram Nagar, streets supplied by two different networks have competing sets 
of over ground pipes running side by side. The Chnatrapati Shivaji Mavrata Ustaw Mandal 
network (No.15 on the Map) reflects just such a competitive situation and given that it is the 
most recent type of network to emerge, it probably heralds the appearance of competing 
networks in the same space. 
This overview of how the various systems were created demonstrates how each of 
the 15 networks has resulted from its own specific set of circumstances. This heterogeneity 
reflects very different political, ideological and financial imperatives and culminates in just as 
wide a variety of day-to-day operational situations and performances.  
3  Evaluation of systems: Both regulations and performances need to be improved 
3.1 Intermittent services with widely differing performances (see Table 2). 
The technical configuration of the water service (turning on the pump) imposes 
considerable timing and quality constraints. The rules and amount of water allocated vary 
considerably between different systems. The quantity of litres per household per day (LHD) 
ranges from 125 LHD in the worst case, equivalent to 30 litres per person per day (LPD), to 
432 LHD or a little over 100 LPD in the best example. The median quantity for the 15 groups 
is 250 LHD or 60 LPD, whereas the BMC’s stated aim is to supply at least 90 LPD, thus 
illustrating the area’s prevailing “hydric stress”. Each group sets its own distribution 
frequency which may be either once or several times a day, in the morning, afternoon or 
evening. Smaller networks (of less than 150 households) find it much easier than larger 
networks to adapt water distribution times to member needs.  
The number of households drawing water from the same tap tends to increase with 
group size and too many users per tap can have harmful consequences. First, it increases 
electricity consumption as the pump has to keep running longer to supply all of the users for 
a given tap; and secondly, it increases tensions between users which may boil over in the 
event of power cuts or if the pump cuts out. In the case of three user group networks, fears 
over water scarcity caused by increasingly frequent power cuts led to the installation of 
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individual taps for each household. This helped head off possible conflicts by individualising 
water storage and it meant that each user was equally affected by power cuts.  
Although the intermittent service is a drag for individual families, it does give user 
groups a certain degree of control over their water and electricity bills. Unlike a simple user 
group that only pays for the amount of water actually consumed, the members of this type 
of network must also bear the additional operating costs related to the size and upkeep of 
their infrastructures. These variable costs comprise: 1) the water bill for the actual water 
consumed by the group plus any leakage back into the network; 2) the electricity bill which 
depends on how long the motorised pump is used for every day as well as how old and 
powerful it is; and 3) the bill for maintenance and upkeep, that is, the wages of the 
community technician in charge of the technical upkeep and operation of the system. 
Cost recovery for group bills is based on a flat rate that includes an individual 
consumption and operation charge. Each member household pays a fixed monthly amount26 
regardless of variations in overall group consumption. This fixed monthly amount ranges 
from 50 to 100 rupees depending on the group. An additional levy is charged to those 
“renting” households who contributed little or nothing to the initial cost of acquiring and 
setting up the infrastructure, who pay between 130 and 200 rupees a month. The group 
treasurer keeps the books and in the event of non-payment of a member, each group has a 
system of fines, usually consisting of an additional 5 to 10 rupees per month overdue. The 
recovery rate is usually close to 100 per cent due partly to close ties and the geographical 
proximity of households. But it is also down to the efficiency of the network managers in 
organising and legitimising regular bill payments as well as a real ability to pay by the group 
members in spite of their extremely limited financial resources.  
Once group bills have been settled, depending on the organisation, the flat rate may 
be used to finance other community-type activities such as “Shramik Vikassi Vibhag 
Mandal” which now offers a whole range of sports, artistic and religious activities thirteen 
years after it was first set up in 1994. And the little office that was originally created to track 
and record the payment of individual bills gradually added new activities and has now 
evolved into a small micro-credit agency.  
                                                          
26 But this fixed charge may rise over time in line with annual increases in the group bill, especially due to 
increases in electricity prices. 
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So this flat rate system appears to work quite well and to provide an effective 
alternative to simply splitting group invoices among all members. However, it is for reasons 
of accounting expediency that a fixed monthly amount is billed and this amount does not 
reflect the actual cost which varies in line with actual electricity and water consumption. 
“Actual cost” comprises the system’s effective consumption and operating costs and is equal 
to the total amount of group invoices for each user group divided by the total number of 
members. For the fifteen networks taken as a whole, the average actual cost comes out at 
8.5 rupees per 1,000 litres, or nearly two and a half times the cost billed by the 
municipality27. This cost reflects the point of economic equilibrium28 that the flat rate or the 
“cost billed” to the user has to cover. “Cost billed” corresponds to the flat rate charged in 
relation to quantity allocated and varies considerably between different user groups. It 
comes out on average at 10.3 rupees per 1,000 litres, or three times what the municipality 
initially charges users in the slums. In theory, actual cost should tie back to cost billed and 
the greater the disparity between the two, the farther away the group is from an optimal 
break-even situation. But this ideal is not necessarily the norm and some groups may find it 
advantageous to generate a monthly surplus. The variance between actual cost and cost 
billed to the user corresponds to a residual surplus or deficit once the user group has paid all 
its invoices. Large surpluses may be due either to a large positive difference between the flat 
rate charged and the individualised monthly cost of the service, or simply to the large 
number of group members who multiply this difference proportionally. The surplus 
generated may be set aside as a reserve to cover the cost of repairing the network or an 
increase in consumption in a given quarter or else to fund network improvements or even 
other community-type activities. And surpluses may vary greatly from one quarter to the 
next in line with consumption patterns. Groups that are running a deficit may correct this by 
simply cutting down the quantities of water allocated (as happened in the Tanaji Vadi Seva 
Mandal group in fourth-quarter 2007) or by increasing the flat rate charged to users. Three 
groups that had been providing their members with quite large quantities of water (over 300 
LHD) raised their flat rate charge on 1 July 200729 in order to cover their costs. Financial 
equilibrium appears easier to control in smaller groups of less than 200 members. 
                                                          
27 Since 1 July 2002, the municipality has been billing an additional 60 per cent for sanitation charges at the 
basic rate of 2.25 rupees/1,000 litres that it charges to the slums. Consequently, 1,000 litres of water would be 
billed in the slums at 3.6 rupees [2.25rupees + (2.25 x 60%)]. 
28 Which can also legitimately be referred to as the break-even point in more commercial systems. 
29 In India, July comes just after the summer holidays, marking the start of the school year. 
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The day-to-day running of these systems bears out the significant differences in the 
services provided using approaches specific to each group. Some provide a fairly good 
service, others a rather poor one and it is only reasonable to try to analyse the factors 
driving such differences. What are the variables that enable certain groups to provide a 
better service?  
3.2 Comparative system evaluation framework and isolation of distinct variables  
  The research sample area comprised 15 water distribution systems each of which, in 
spite of similar constraints (common geographical area, low incomes of the population 
served, same system based around a motorised pump), offer varying levels of service 
dictated by their own specific circumstances. It is therefore worthwhile isolating a number of 
criteria to evaluate the performance of each of these services such as quantity, cost, 
appropriateness, and system sustainability (financial management). Each system was rated 1 
to 5 on each criterion and the overall rating process resulted in a mark out of 20 and a 
league table. The evaluation and resulting league table for the different services enable us to 
highlight a number of variables (that tend to boost or hamper efficiency) and to make 
recommendations. 
1) PRICE (cost billed30 for 1,000 litres of water) is the primary indicator of the cost borne by 
the user in return for the service. This rating31 ranges from 0 if the price is greater than 14 
rupees per 1,000 litres, to 5 when it costs less than 6 rupees per 1,000 litres.  
2) QUANTITY (the actual daily quantity allocated) is a key component in the evaluation. A 
fairly cheap service that only allocates a small amount of water is not deemed to be as good 
by certain users who prefer to pay a little more in order to receive a greater quantity. This 
rating32 ranges from 0 when the quantity is less than 150 litres per day, to 5 when it exceeds 
350 litres.  
                                                          
30 The price of the service includes not only the water bill - which determines the quantity allocated - but the 
electricity bill and the cost of paying the technician.  
31 This rating is based around the pricing structure operated by MCGM. The cross-subsidisation system 
applied in Mumbai means that non-domestic consumers pay 50 per cent of water charges even though they 
only consume 8 per cent of the water. This allows the municipality to apply a “social water rate” for the slums 
which only pay 3.6 rupees per 1,000 litres. So, the average cost for 1,000 litres billed comes out at 10 rupees 
per 1,000 litres and we based our rating around this average. 
32 This rating is based on the UN-Habitat criterion whereby a household needs at least 150 litres of water a 
day (UN-Habitat, 2003) 
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3) APPROPRIATENESS OF SERVICE (the fit between the service and user expectations) is 
evaluated using two sub-criteria: water distribution times (A) and number of households per 
tap (B). “Appropriateness of service” is obtained by weighing these two sub-components 
(x1/2) and then adding them together (A+B). The rating for sub-criterion A (water 
distribution times) ranges from –1 when the times are extremely inconvenient (irregular or 
at night), to +5 when they are adapted to the population’s needs (twice a day, once in the 
morning and once in the evening)33. The rating for sub-criterion B (number of households 
per tap) ranges from 0 when over ten families share the same tap, to 5 when each 
household has its own tap. 34 
4) FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT (the extent to which the individual flat-rate charge covers the 
cost of the service, thus ensuring its long-term future) is evaluated using two sub-criteria: 
the accounting balance (C) and the difference between the monthly cost billed to the user 
and the actual individualised monthly operating cost (D). The rating for sub-criterion C35 
(accounting balance) must reflect the group’s specific circumstances. Most of the water 
distribution systems do not have a market-based approach (only two are clearly run for 
profit) and their core objective is to serve the population. So, the evaluation of accounting 
profit or loss is based on the managers’ ability to offer users as cheap a service as possible 
without jeopardising the system’s financial equilibrium. Unlike a capitalist economic 
                                                          
33 The most frequent complaint concerns distribution times that force a member of a household to wait for 
the distribution to begin in order to store water. 
When all group users are supplied during the evening: +3 points. 
When some users are supplied at night: -1 point. 
When distribution times are regular: +1point. When they are irregular: -1point. 
When they “alternate” (they alternate daily but in a pre-defined manner): +1point. 
When water is only distributed once every two days: -1point; 
When water is distributed daily: +0 point; 
When it is distributed twice a day: +1 point. 
34 A lot of users would like to have their own individual taps and an offer to this effect which was launched by 
the private entrepreneur Appa Balgue (Shriram Sanjeevan Pani Prakalpt group) in 2003 was copied by a 
number of other systems, thus highlighting the increasing demand for individualised service.  
35 Negative balance: income is insufficient to cover total costs. Insofar as it jeopardises the long-term future 
of the system, any network with a negative balance will be rated negatively: -1 point. 
Balanced books: income is equal to expenditure. We consider the books to be in balance when the 
surplus/deficit does not exceed 1,000 rupees per month. 
The network has near-optimal financial management, however, it could still have to contend with exceptional 
financing requirements for repairs or improvements: +2 points. 
A small surplus of between 1,000 and 5,000 rupees per month. This surplus provides a bulwark against future 
unpaid bills or network repairs: +3points. 
Large surplus with redistribution: any surplus greater than 5,000 rupees can be used to finance other 
community-type activities, to revamp other public services or for network repairs and improvements. Although 
the network’s primary purpose is water distribution, the financial surplus may also be used for the benefit of 
the group as a whole so large surpluses are assigned a rating of +1point. 
Large surplus without any redistribution: the surplus does not benefit the group as a whole: 0 point. 
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approach, our study does not treat a large surplus as necessarily indicating “good 
management”, but rather a lack of distribution. Nevertheless, a small surplus may be vital for 
ensuring the long-term future of the network and providing a reserve to pay for any 
maintenance or repair charges. And while balanced books have the advantage of indicating a 
redistributive approach, they may leave the system exposed to the risk of unpaid bills in the 
event of major repairs or upkeep charges. The rating for sub-criterion D (difference between 
the actual monthly operating cost and the monthly cost billed to the user) is contingent on 
the surplus that certain groups generate, sometimes due simply to their large number of 
members. It is therefore important not to penalise large groups and to compensate them for 
points they may have lost due to their large surplus by rating the variance between the 
monthly cost billed to users and the actual individualised monthly costs.36 
The QUALITY criterion was not used because none of the households interviewed 
complained about poor quality water or any water-related illnesses. 
3.3 League table37 and identification of an ideal-type user group network 
(See the summary table and Diagram No.3 – water system league table based on a 20 point 
evaluation – Appendix) 
As we can see from the summary table and diagram No.3, the first nine groups are 
small in size comprising less than 200 households and characterised by strong community 
ties between members. Conversely, the lowest ratings were obtained by the largest 
networks: Sarna Gay Seera Trust (500 households) only got 1 point, Utkarsh Rahivasi Mandal 
(650 households) 2.5 points and Tanaji Vadi Seva Mandal a mere 3.5 points. 
                                                          
36 Equivalence between costs: There is only a very small difference - less than 10 rupees per month per user - 
between the flat rate charged to users and the actual operating cost. This means that users are paying the 
correct rate: +2 points. 
Small difference: There is a relatively small difference - between 10 and 19 rupees per month per user - 
between the flat rate charged to users and the actual operating cost. Users pay a relatively high, but still 
reasonable rate: +1 point. 
Big difference: There is a significant difference - between 20 and 30 rupees per month per user - between the 
flat rate charged to users and the actual operating cost. The service is expensive: 0 point. 
Very big difference: There is a very big difference - over 30 rupees per month per user - between the flat rate 
charged to users and the actual operating cost. The service is too expensive: -1 point. 
37  We need to put this factual classification into perspective insofar as the data describes management at a 
given point in time: some groups may have suffered from a recent increase in their flat rate and would have 
scored much better if they had been surveyed just before; conversely, groups that had not yet put up their flat 
rate when the survey was conducted got a much better score. 
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A group’s rating and a comparison with the number of households in the group point 
to a strong correlation between group size and service provided: service performance tends 
to deteriorate as the number of users increases. 
Involving communities in planning, acquiring and running the water distribution 
network would appear the best way of delivering an affordable service that meets user 
expectations. The top three systems – Krishna Seva Mandal, Sri Prasad Rahivasi Vikas 
Mandal and Nav Yug Rahivasi Vasi Mandal – are perfect examples. Two of these were 
completely (or almost completely) self-financed. Their small size as well as user ownership of 
infrastructures appears to enhance service performance. 
Therefore, the major findings of this evaluation are that smaller-sized user group 
networks perform best, however they are heavily penalised by higher per-litre water 
charges.38 
So we can use the evaluation to develop an ideal-type user group: a small-sized 
group with about a hundred households and strong bonds of trust between members; 
considerable community involvement in financing the infrastructure as this helps create a 
stakeholder dynamic; costs billed to users that correspond to actual operating costs while 
generating a small surplus that may be used to improve the system over the medium term. 
3.4 What is the most effective institutional framework for these user group networks? 
As user group networks have obtained de facto long-term recognition, it would 
appear necessary to clarify municipal/community relations in order to optimise their modus 
operandi for the benefit of users. The key is to achieve the best possible between between 
the positive aspects of these systems and more effective integration at municipal level.  
Although the following recommendations were devised for a specific case, that is, 
Ram Nagar, they may also be applied to other neglected districts faced with similar 
geographical and social constraints. 
 First and foremost, these systems must have preferential water and electricity rates and 
any such cross-subsidisation scheme is contingent on institutional recognition of their 
                                                          
38 On account of group electricity and upkeep/repair invoices that must be added to water charges.   
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specific features.39 However, we do not recommend that managers contractualise exist-
ing arrangements in the neighbourhood. We consider that this could be counter-
productive and have an adverse impact on access to the service by upsetting informal ar-
rangements already in place.40 
 As regards the allocation of group connections by the municipality, simply formalising 
existing procedures is the best solution at present. We should highlight two points here. 
First, making administrative exceptions for unauthorised populations would avoid a pro-
cess of “cumulative exclusion”41 of the most distressed populations. Second, recom-
mending smaller groups – without making this an official obligation so as not to hamper 
private entrepreneurs – would encourage the development of practices and standards 
that are more in line with user expectations. 
 From a technical perspective, building overhead tanks would appear an ideal solution for 
dealing with the problem of intermittent service although this in turn raises new ques-
tions. Would such tanks allow the energy consumed by the pumps to be managed in an 
optimal manner? Would the resulting necessity of installing water meters be beneficial 
for each household? And would the investment needed to build the overhead tanks be 
economically viable? Getting answers to this complex series of questions requires much 
more detailed technical, social and economic analyses. 
 And, last but not least, municipal action in the area requires two-way dialogue with 
community representatives that will make it possible for new policies to be taken up by 
those most concerned. 
What is really key here is the need to preserve user group autonomy and combine 
this with preferential rates provided by the municipality in order to spatially regulate areas 
                                                          
39 While electricity subsidies are not really possible in an Indian context, it should be possible to lower water 
charges per 1,000 litres for connections in this neighbourhood to offset the cost of running the mechanised 
pump. We suggest subsidising water charges to bring down the rates charged in the slums by a third, that is, 
2.4 rupees per 1,000 litres (1.5 rupees +60% for sanitation) instead of the 3.6 rupees (2.25 rupees +60% for 
sanitation) currently charged. This would make it possible to supply 500 extra litres for the same price, or 
1,500 litres for 3.6 rupees. So, for the same amount charged, this would increase the median quantity 
delivered from 250 LHD to 333 LHD, or by an average of 83 LPD (which is close to the minimum quantity that 
the BMC is supposed to supply to users). 
40 Especially given the bureaucratic and technocratic approach of the municipality and the local community’s 
distrust of it. 
41 No legally authorised status → no official documents → no access to the service → access to a more 
expensive and less efficient service. 
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like this one and provide them with a public service that is differentiated in terms of its 
offering but integrated into the water distribution system as a whole. 
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Conclusion 
A virtually non-existent municipal offering coupled with a weak institutional 
environment and a highly specific geographical context has led users in the slum of Ram 
Nagar to take water distribution into their own hands. Although they are far from perfect, 
“user group networks” represent a definite step forward for the inhabitants and they are 
proof of their ability to become involved in a management process adapted to local 
circumstances.  
Can these user group networks really provide a long-term alternative to the 
conventional public water supply system? 
Faced with the difficulties of deploying a centralised, efficient and universal system, 
the municipality obviously has much to gain from continuing to pass its responsibilities vis-à-
vis this area - which now has official legal authorisation – onto the slum dwellers themselves. 
However the shoddy overall level of service and the widely differing performances of the 
different user groups fly in the face of any notion of equity as theoretically defined in a 
public service charter. They also set off political-financial struggles that divide the area into a 
number of territories. 
So, while these alternative arrangements have provided temporary solutions to water 
access in Ram Nagar, their long-term survival is contingent on securing preferential rates and 
cross-subsidies from the municipal system. This would involve setting up cross-subsidies for 
both water and electricity rates while continuing to give free rein to innovation and facilitate 
a gradual improvement in access to the service. Closer ties between the municipality and the 
communities, therefore, appear to be a sine qua non for the long-term sustainability of user 
group networks. 
More generally, serious consideration needs to be given to providing institutional 
recognition for certain stop-gap solutions deployed in the slums because once they are 
officially authorised, they can provide a valuable option for developing the public service. 
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Appendices 
MAPS 
Map n°1 and n°2: location of the research area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: google earth 
Map n°3: Urbanisation of the site 
 
Source: Google Earth 
Shivaji Nagar, Tembhipada :Main Water Supply  :Ram Nagar Park 
 
Park Area studied Main water supply 
Occasional paper n°30 
27 
Map n°4: S-ward water supply 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
Map n°5: Mapping of the 15 user group networks 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
Area poorly supplied or not 
supplied with water due to 
a lack of pressure (altitude 
in excess of 50 meters) 
 Water Supply Area  
S-Ward water tank (located at an 
altitude of 50 meters)  
Main Water Supply  
 (see Diagram n°1) 
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Map n°6: Political geography of Ram Nagar based around the user group networks 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
 Degree of politicisation of the group: 
 Power struggle 
 Major politico-ideological affiliation of the group: 
: No political affiliation 
 Location of groups ( in order of appearance): 
: Strong : Very Strong : Weak : Depending on circumstances : None 
Commercial 
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DIAGRAMS 
Diagram n°1: pressure and altitude 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
S-Ward’s water system can supply water to areas at an altitude of between 0 and 45/50 meters 
max. 
The dwellings are served in a "conventional" way by the municipality. There is no pressure problem. 
Users are not supplied by the S-Ward water tank but are connected directly to the conduct of the water supply system. 
Pressure is good up to 55 meters.  
 Between 55 and 60 meters, pressure is very poor.                                  Above 60 meters, taps are not cannot be used: 
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Diagram n°2: Technical operation of the user group network 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
The infrastructure of a "user group network" includes: 
 A connection (2) by the BMC directly to the primary water mains (1) Its size, identical for each mini 
network, measures 6 inches (or 2.541 cm). 
 One water meter (3) fixed onto that connection for measuring water consumption. 
 One tank (4) placed in close proximity to the connection. Its capacity is variable and usually depends 
on the initial funding attended by more than the number of people to serve. Thus, its capacity can 
vary from 5,000 litres for the smallest (self-funded) networks to 100,000 litres for the largest (with 
funds from outside the community). 
 A motorised electric pump (5): its power varies from 5 to 15 HP74 HP. It is plugged directly into the 
tank and pumps the water in the mini grid. 
 An electrical connection (6): the connection is significant and supports three-phase power flow. 
 One electricity meter (7) charges the power consumption required to operate the pump. 
 A solid structure (8): to house the tank and the pump. This also requires purchasing or leasing land. 
 Main water pipes (9): their size varies between 5 cm and 7 cm depending on the project. Their length 
can vary from 40 meters for the smallest system to 400 meters for the largest. It is not buried to 
reduce costs. 
 A system of unburied secondary pipes (10) connects the main line to a set of collective and 
sometimes individual "street taps”
42
 (11) (for three of the five networks). 
 A system of valves (12): supply the various divisions of the entire mini-system when water is 
distributed. 
                                                          
42 ‘Gali tap’ (Tovey 2002).  
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ILLUSTRATION 
Photographic material: summary of Ram Nagar’s specific geographical fea-
tures 
 
Source: Based on the authors’ research 
 
1: Sanjay Gandhi National Park: 
nature reserve of 104km2, 
founded in 1969. 
 
2: A long wall encircles the park to 
prevent new populations moving 
in. It delineates a boundary 
between urban space and natural 
space. It peaks at 110 meters on 
the crest of the mountain. 
 
3: The urbanisation of the area 
occurred from the “bottom up”, 
until it reached the wall of the 
Park. The area studied, "Ram 
Nagar", stretches from the eastern 
side, between 50 and 110 meters 
high and comprises a total area of 
approximately 1000 m2. 
 
4: Ram Nagar is wedged between 
the wall at 110 meters high, and 
four broad pipes of the water 
supply system of Mumbai. 
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GRAPHS 
Graph n°1: number of households supplied via the 15 networks in 2007 
(classified in chronological order of creation) 
 
 
Graph n°2: Share of each actor in the total funding of the 15 networks 
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Graph n°3: Classification of the 15 systems evaluated (out of a possible total of 20 
points) 
 
 
Evaluation Mark (Out of 20) 
: 
: Total members by user group networks 
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TABLES 
User group networks (by name and date of creation) 
 
1992:Shramik Vikassi Vibhag Mandal  
1992:Tanaji Vadi 
1993:Sarna gay Seerra trust  
1994:Utkarsh Rahivasi Mandal  
1996:Om sai Chawl 
1997:Sri Prasad Rahivasi Vikas Mandal  
1997:Desai Committee 
1998:Khrishna Seva Mandal 
1999:Sri Chhatrapati Rahivasi Sangh  
2000:Shiv Shakti Vikas Rahivasi Mandal  
2001:Nav Yug Rahivasi Vasi Mandal 
2002:Navnath mandal  
2003:Shiv Prena Mandal 
2003:Shriram Sanjeevan Pani Prakalpt  
2005:Chnatrapathi Shivaji Mavrata Utsaw Mandal 
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Table n°1: Who finances? 
 
 
Number of 
households 
2007 
 
 
Household 
contribution 
(in Rs.) 
 
 
 
Total cost  
reported 
(in Rs.) 
 
Total 
contributions 
collected 
(in Rs.) 
 
through 
households 
 
through 
politicians 
 
through 
NGOs 
 
through 
BMC 
 
through 
entrepreneurs 
 
388 2250 1500000 2273000 873000 700000 700000 0 0 
725 600 1500000 2135000 435000 1000000 700000 0 0 
500 3251 1000000 2675500 1625500 0 0 0 1050000 
650 1200 1200000 1572000 780000 42000 750000 0 0 
40 6000 200000 240000 240000 0 0 0 0 
144 7000 250000 1038000 1008000 30000 0 0 0 
100 3500 240000 450000 350000 100000 
  
0 
79 5200 400000 410800 410800 0 0 0 0 
846 1000 1500000 1546000 846000 700000 0 0 0 
150 2000 400000 400000 300000 100000 0 0 0 
185 2000 300000 520000 370000 150000 
  
0 
140 1500 300000 310000 210000 100000 0 0 0 
130 2000 200000 290000 260000 30000 0 0 0 
200 3500 500000 924000 700000 0 0 0 224000 
175 500 400000 487500 87500 400000 0 0 0 
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Table n°2: What service at what price? 
Number of 
households 
In 2007 
 
Number of litres 
supplied per 
household per 
day 
 
Number of 
households 
on 1 tap 
 
Monthly fee 
charged
43
 
(in Rs.) 
 
Cost charged for 
1000 litres 
(in Rs.) 
 
Real cost  for 
1000 litres 
(in Rs.) 
 
388 323 1 100 10,7 5,53 
725 230 8 75 10,5 7,57 
500 125 5 80 20,64 14,4 
650 206 12 65 11,7 5,4 
40 224 5 70 10 10,4 
144 311 1 70 7,2 6,8 
100 164,2 2 60 11,8 8,8 
79 340 3 70 6,6 6,6 
846 263 10 50 7,7 6,7 
150 179 6 75 13,5 12,6 
185 432 3 100 7,4 7,7 
140 320 3 100 10 7,13 
130 184 2 60 10,5 9,4 
200 150 1 50 10,8 10,6 
175 307 5 50 5,25 7,5 
 
                                                          
43 These fees are between 130 rupees and 200 rupees for "tenants", including Adivasis, who have not 
participated in the financing. 
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Table n°3: SUMMARY 
 
Name of the “user group 
network” 
(in chronological order of 
creation) 
 
Number of 
households 
 
appropriateness 
of the service 
criterion 
(on 5 pts) 
 
financial 
management 
criterion (on 
5 pts) 
 
quantity 
criterion 
(on 5pts) 
 
price 
criterion 
(on 5pts) 
 
TOTAL 
(on 20 
points) 
 
1992:Shramik Vikassi Vibhag Mandal (1) 388 3 1 4 2 10 
1992:Tanaji Vadi (2) 725 -0,5 0 2 2 3,5 
1993:Sarna gay Seerra trust (3) 500 2 -1 0 0 1 
1994:Utkarsh Rahivasi Mandal (4) 650 -0,5 0 2 1 2,5 
1996:Om sai Chawl (5) 40 4 3 2 3 12 
1997:Sri Prasad Rahivasi Vikas Mandal (6) 144 4,25 4 4 4 16,25 
1997:Desai Committee (7) 100 4,5 5 1 1 11,5 
1998:Khrishna Seva Mandal (8) 79 4,5 4 4 4 16,5 
1999:Sri Chhatrapati Rahivasi Sangh (9) 846 1 2 3 4 10 
2000:Shiv Shakti Vikas Rahivasi 
Mandal (10) 
150 0,5 4 1 1 6,5 
2001:Nav Yug Rahivasi Vasi Mandal (11) 185 3 4 5 4 16 
2002:Navnath mandal (12) 140 4,5 3 4 3 14,5 
2003:Shiv Prena Mandal (13) 130 4 4 1 2 11 
2003:Shriram Sanjeevan Pani Prakalpt (14) 200 4,25 4 1 2 11,25 
2005:Chnatrapathi Shivaji Mavrata Utsaw 
Mandal (15) 
175 2,5 -1 4 5 10,5 
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